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1 Summary
As we perform daily activities—driving to work, unlocking the office door, grabbing a coffee cup—
our actions seem automatic and preprogrammed. Nonetheless, routine, well-practiced behavior is
continually modulated by incidental experience: in repetitive experimental tasks, recent (∼4) trials
reliably influence performance and action choice. Psychological theories downplay the significance
of sequential effects, explaining them as rapidly decaying perturbations of behavior with no long-
term consequences. We challenge this traditional perspective in two studies designed to probe the
impact of more distant experience, finding evidence for effects spanning up to a thousand inter-
mediate events. We present a normative theory in which these persistent effects reflect optimal
adaptation to a dynamic environment exhibiting varying rates of change. The theory predicts a
heavy-tailed decaying influence of past experience, consistent with our data, and suggests that indi-
vidual incidental experiences are catalogued in a temporally extended memory utilized to optimize
subsequent behavior.
2 Introduction
As we move through our daily lives, we encounter an ongoing barrage of mundane stimuli that
demand routine responses. This incidental experience forms the fabric of our interaction with the
world. Clearly, the sum of this experience determines our behavior, but how much effect does each
experience have on how we act at a later time?
The effects of recent experience on decision making can be studied via a Two-Alternative Forced-
Choice (2AFC) task. On each trial, one of two stimuli is presented. Subjects are asked to press
one of two response keys as quickly as possible. Response time (RT) varies reliably as a function
of the exact sequence of preceding trials1-4 (e.g., Figure 1a). These sequential dependencies are
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Figure 1: Reanalysis of a representative sequential effects study.4(Expt. 1) a) Mean RTs for current trial type—repetition (R) or
alternation (A)—as a function of sequence history (current trial at top of label). Error bars here and elsewhere for behavioral
data indicate standard error. Exponential (red) and power (blue) models—with full context horizon—fit to per-subject trial-
by-trial data and averaged across subjects. b) Goodness of model fit (R2) as a function of context horizon. Error bars indicate
standard error of R2 difference between models,14 thus aiding in comparing models but not horizons.
not a mere laboratory curiosity but can have a meaningful impact on naturalistic decision making.
For example, professional basketball players choose their shot locations based on recent attempts
and successes.5 Recent braking or acceleration actions of automobile drivers can explain variability
in response latencies of up to 100 ms, potentially the difference between a collision and a near
miss.6 Sequential dependencies have also been demonstrated in legal reasoning and jury evidence
interpretation7-8 and clinical assessments.9
Sequential dependencies arise naturally from psychological and neurological models of incremen-
tal learning, including error correction methods (e.g. gradient descent),10 reinforcement learning,11
and Hebbian learning.12 These models yield an exponentially discounted influence of past trials,
which explains the inverted-V pattern common to many 2AFC experiments (as in Figure 1a). Sim-
ilarly, models from optimal control theory for tracking nonstationary environments, such as the
Kalman filter,13 also produce exponential decay. These models are all appealing because the past
trial history is captured by a single state variable (or sufficient statistic) that can be maintained
and updated from trial to trial.
Models that produce exponential decay of past trials predict sequential dependencies to operate
only on short timescales. Moreover, analyses of sequential dependencies have focused on the short
timescale, and the design of experiments has not been well suited to measuring longer-range effects.
However, several studies hint at the possibility that a single experience can have a long-range
influence on behavior minutes15,16 or even a day17 later, consistent with an alternative theoretical
perspective in which each experience is stored in long-term memory, and behavior is guided by the
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cumulative impact of these memories.18-19
Instead of an exponential discounting of the past, long-term memory is typically characterized
as following a “power law of forgetting.”20-24 Power functions are qualitatively different from ex-
ponential functions because they can produce a single curve that exhibits both rapid decay of the
most recent trials (a strong short-term recency effect) and slow decay of far-back trials (a long-range
residual effect). With exponential decay, long-term effects are vanishingly small, at least with decay
rates in the range needed to explain short-term recency.
Our investigation explored the persistence of incidental experience, both in terms of the scope
of its influence and the nature of its decay. We began by reanalyzing trial-by-trial data from a
typical 2AFC experiment.4 We compared two models of sequential effects that assume that subjects
form an expectation for the next trial using an average of previous trials which is weighted either
exponentially or according to a power function. RT was predicted to be fast when the expectation
matched the actual trial and slow when it did not. Throughout the article, each model was fit to
the specific trial history of individual subjects, by minimizing the mean squared error across all
trials. Both models had a single theoretically relevant free parameter for determining the relative
weighting of past trials.
By following the analysis used in previous investigations (Figure 1a), it was not possible to
gauge the persistence of experience or to differentiate between the two models. Thus, to examine
the influence of past trials more closely, we studied how model fits vary as a function of the number
of past trials used to form each expectation (the context horizon). Coefficient of determination
(R2) values were obtained from separate fits for each context horizon, with one free parameter
regardless of horizon size (Figure 1b). Increasing the horizon beyond eight trials back yields reliable
improvements in fit: across models that use 8 to 1024 past trials, there is a significant effect of
horizon on R2 (F (7, 63) = 3.87, p = .001), but despite the appearance of a better fit for the power
model, the interaction between horizon and model was not reliable (F (7, 63) = 1.51, p = .18).
This earlier study was limited because higher-order sequence statistics were not controlled—
introducing an additional source of variability—and because distinguishing predictions of the two
models is difficult when sequences have no structure. The latter point is due to the fact that, when
the two trial types—repetition and alternation—occur with equal probability, their influence tends
to cancel out, regardless of how strongly individual trials are weighted.
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Figure 2: Experiment 1. a) Mean RTs for positive and negative autocorrelation conditions as a function of sequence history.
Exponential and power models—with full context horizon—fit to per-subject trial-by-trial data and averaged across subjects.
b) Goodness of model fit (R2) as a function of horizon. Error bars as in Figure 1. c) Lag profile averaged across conditions and
subjects in log-log coordinates. Mean of exponential and power function fits to per-subject lag profiles. d) Difference in mean
RT for repetition and alternation trials by block (234 trials) for each autocorrelation condition.
3 Autocorrelation in the Sequence Structure (Experiment 1)
We therefore conducted a 2AFC study with a biased sequence structure in two opposing conditions,
one in which 2/3 of the trials were repetitions of the preceding trial and one in which 2/3 of the
trials were alternations of the preceding trial—positive and negative autocorrelation, respectively.
As expected, RTs were modulated by the short-term context (Figure 2a). However, behavior
also depended on the autocorrelation structure: RTs for repetition trials (left side of Figure 2a)
were faster in the positive condition than the negative condition and vice versa for alternation
trials. The difference due to autocorrelation structure when conditioned on the immediate context
indicates that the the influence of the past extends beyond four trials back. Although one cannot
determine how far back from Figure 2a, a preference for the power model emerges when fits to
the per-subject trial-by-trial data are aggregated according to the four-back sequence history. R2
between model and data across the 32 histories (16 in each condition) was greater for the power
model for 25 of the 27 subjects (mean R2 across subjects: .798 vs. .730; paired t-test, t(26) = 7.45,
p < .001).∗
∗R2 values reported for the means of the four-back sequence histories are higher than those for the individual
trial data—e.g., Figure 1a—because some sources of variability are averaged out.
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Support for a long-range sequential effect is obtained by examining the R2 values for the two
models with varied context horizons (Figure 2b). The exponential model fit improves reliably as
more trials are included out to 64 trials (comparing 64 vs. 32, t(26) = 3.23, p = .0033), with a
marginal improvement out to 128 trials but no further (128 vs. 64, t(26) = 1.99, p = .058; 1024
vs. 128, t(26) = 1.25, p = .22). In contrast, the power model fit improves out to 1024 trials
(1024 vs. 512, t(26) = 3.60, p = .0013). Behavior in this task is clearly affected by a long history
of prior experience. Additionally, individuals appear to leverage the complete trial history in a
way more consistent with a power model than an exponential model (main effect of model type,
F (1, 26) = 93.9, p < .001; interaction of model type and horizon, F (7, 182) = 65.6, p < .001).
Further support for power over exponential decay is obtained by studying a lag profile derived
from the data, plotted on a log-log scale in Figure 2c. The lag profile isolates the effect of the
trial ` trials in the past by computing the difference between mean RT when the current trial does
not match the lag-` trial and mean RT when those trials do match. Because the exponential and
power models both predict a lag profile that matches the decay function, this analysis offers another
means of differentiating the models. The empirical lag profile appears linear in log-log coordinates
suggesting power decay. We fit individual subject lag profiles to both power and exponential
functions and obtained a better fit for the power function (mean R2 across subjects: .878 vs. .855;
t(26) = 2.17, p = .039).
If individuals store incidental experience in a long-lasting memory, we should be able to observe
a cumulative effect of trial statistics across the entire course of the experiment. Figure 2d reveals
a preference for repetitions in the positive condition that increases as the experiment progresses,
and a preference for alternation in the negative condition. When superimposed over Figure 2d,
predictions derived from power model fits capture the long-range effect of condition. In contrast,
the trajectory from the exponential model fits is roughly flat because the model cannot benefit
from integrating beyond about 64 past trials.
The power model is appealing because it is capable of explaining effects across a range of
timescales, from the variation due to the immediate four-back context to the bias that grows over
the hour-long duration of the sequence in each autocorrelation condition.
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4 Sequential Dependencies in Motor Control (Experiment 2)
Although we have argued for a unified explanation of short- and long-term adaptation via the
power model, there is an alternative, though somewhat less parsimonious, possibility that the
two timescales reflect distinct mechanisms. For instance, in the autocorrelation study, sequence
structure might have been detected by subjects, leading to explicit learning and deliberate biasing
of behavior. We thus aimed to strengthen our story by demonstrating the persistence of incidental
experience in the absence of sequential structural regularity.
However, previous studies with balanced sequences did not uncover long-range effects when
response latency was the dependent variable. We conjectured that response latency may not be
a terribly sensitive measure because speedy responses are a secondary consideration in the perfor-
mance of 2AFC; responding correctly is the subjects’ primary goal. Consequently, RTs may be
more susceptible to perturbation by task-unrelated factors. If we studied a task that offers behav-
ioral measures that are aligned with the subjects’ primary goals, we hoped to expose a persistent
influence of incidental experience despite the previously described cancellation of far-back effects
that results from balanced sequences.
One domain of study that seems suitable is motor control because movement trajectories re-
flect planning processes. Long-term motor adaptation has been observed when systematic and
consistent perturbations were applied to the control system.25-27 Some support for the persistent
influence of incidental experience is found in an eye movement task in which error-based adapta-
tion was observed extending back nearly one hundred trials and decaying according to a power
function.16 However, in this task, correlations could be attributed to endogenous variation rather
than exogenous effects of the target sequence because target timing and position were completely
predictable on every trial. Though ignored in many motor control studies, short-term sequential
dependencies have been demonstrated in reaching tasks where straight-line arm movements were
disrupted by variable perpendicular perturbation forces.28-29
Bridging the gap between traditional 2AFC experiments and motor studies that exhibit sequen-
tial effects, we explored a reaching task with a sequential structure akin to that of 2AFC. Subjects
held the handle of a robotic arm and made rapid 15cm out-and-back movements along the midline
of the transverse plane. Visual feedback of a cursor representing hand position and the start and
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Figure 3: Experiment 2. a) Experimental setup. b) Mean trajectories from blue dot to green dot for different sequences of right
(R) and left (L) perturbations (current trial at right end of label). Sequential dependencies here result from the history of right
and left forces rather than the repetition/alternation sequences (we anticipated this based on the theoretical division between
perceptual and response sequential effects30). c) Goodness of model fit (R2) as a function of context horizon. Error bars as in
Figure 1. d) The lag profile in log-log coordinates with mean exponential and power function fits.
target circles was presented on an LCD screen in front of the subjects (Figure 3a). On each trial,
a perturbing force perpendicular to the desired movement was randomly applied from the right or
left. Rather than imposing an autocorrelation structure as in Experiment 1, right and left forces
were controlled to be equally probable.
Individual trial movement trajectories were affected by the recent trial sequence: subjects com-
pensated for the current perturbation more accurately when it was consistent with the recency-
weighted sequence of prior perturbations (Figure 3b). For the purpose of modeling, accuracy of
the trajectory on a given trial was quantified as the absolute value of the maximum horizontal
deviation of the trajectory. However, other deflection measures—e.g., initial angle, mean deviation,
area under deflection curve—gave similar results. The persistence of past experience is revealed by
analyzing model performance as a function of context horizon (Figure 3c). We find support for the
hypothesis that sequential effects extend back more than 32 trials (one-tailed t-test for 64 vs. 32,
exponential: t(19) = 1.95, p = .033; power: t(19) = 1.89, p = .037). Because the exponential and
power models differ primarily in the weights they assign to far-back trials, we expected that the
balanced sequences in this experiment would make it difficult to compare the two models directly.
Despite this limitation, evidence for power decay over exponential decay is found in the near linear
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trend of the lag profile in log-log coordinates (Figure 3d). Per-subject fits to the lag profile values
are reliably better for a power function than an exponential function (mean R2 across subjects:
.891 vs. .835; t(19) = 4.98, p < .001).
5 A Normative Account of Long-Range Effects
Many theoretical accounts characterize sequential dependencies as a by-product of adaptation to
the statistical structure of a dynamic environment.30-33 These accounts suppose that statistics of the
environment are tracked over time—statistics such as relative stimulus frequency or the magnitude
and direction of perturbing forces. The statistics represent not only a summary of the past, but an
expectation for the future, facilitating tuning of perceptuo-motor control to perform optimally in
the anticipated environment.
If environments have temporal nonstationarity, more recent experience is most indicative of
what an individual will experience next. Specific theoretical formulations lead to specific charac-
terizations of how past experiences should optimally be combined to predict future events. The
Dynamic Belief Model (DBM)33 explains sequential effects as a consequence of optimal Bayesian
inference in an environment whose characteristics are stationary for an interval of time until they
are redrawn from a reset distribution at abrupt changepoints distributed in time according to a
Bernoulli process. The DBM assumptions lead to predictions about behavior that are consistent
with an exponentially decaying lag profile.33 Consequently, the model fails to produce long-range
effects of experience.
We propose an extension of the DBM, called the Hierarchical Dynamic Belief Model or HDBM
(Figure 4a), that yields roughly a power function lag profile and consequently obtains superior
fits to the experimental data than the DBM (Figure 4b; Experiment 1: t(26) = 7.69, p < .0001,
Experiment 2: t(19) = 3.87, p = .0010). The HDBM relaxes a seemingly unnatural assumption in
the DBM: that environmental statistics have a time-invariant probability of change. For example,
are the dynamics of change during a four-hour plane flight really the same as those during the
half hour it takes to deplane, walk through the terminal, collect bags, catch a taxi, and check
into a hotel? The HDBM avoids this limitation by taking a hierarchical Bayesian approach in
which the underlying generative model is a non-homogeneous Bernoulli process, i.e., a process
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Figure 4: a) The graphical model for the Hierarchical Dynamic Belief Model (HDBM). xt is the trial type at time t, γt is
the parameter of the Bernoulli process generating xt, and αt is the change probability. The original DBM33 consists of only
the black part of the graph, with α constant. b) Comparison of model performance for Experiment 1 and 2. Error bars for
the power and exponential models—and similarly for the HDBM and DBM models—represent the standard error of the R2
difference between the two models across subjects.
with a fluctuating changepoint probability that is driven by a separate Markov process. Because
the HDBM models a spectrum of environments—ranging from rapidly changing to stable—its
expectations of the future reflect strong short-term recency as well as long-range dependencies.
The success of the HDBM in fitting the data suggests a normative explanation for the long-
range influence of incidental experience on behavior. Under the assumptions of the HDBM, the
mind optimally adapts to a complex dynamic environment in which even seemingly irrelevant
experiences that occur far in the past offer predictive information about upcoming environmental
states and task demands. Specifically, the expected relevance of a past experience to the current
moment falls off according to an approximate power function.
As previously mentioned, human forgetting of explicit (declarative) knowledge in long-term
memory is often characterized in terms of power decay.20-23 This decay function has been cast
as rational via the observation that in diverse domains—newspaper articles, parental speech, and
electronic mail—the empirical probability of needing access to a specific piece of information is
well fit by a power function of time.34 The present analyses of the DBM and HDBM indicate that
this observation is not well explained by nonstationarity with a fixed change probability, but that
introducing variable change rates provides a good explanation. Thus power decay serves as an
informative connection between between sequential effects, long-term memory, and the statistical
structure of the environment.
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6 Discussion
Contrary to the prevailing assumption that variations in experience produce only fleeting perturba-
tions in behavior, we have argued that incidental priming yields enduring modulations of behavior.
Modeling indicates that past experience is integrated to anticipate the future using a weighting
that is strongly recency based but also has a heavy tail, consistent with power but not exponential
discounting. Power discounting can be characterized as optimal adaptation to the statistics of an
environment with second-order nonstationarity.
To perform optimal prediction in nonstationary environments with changepoint dynamics, the
complete history of experience must be maintained.35 Consequently, our results are consistent with
the perspective that as individuals interact with their world, they continually log their experiences,
forming a library of memory traces that is called on to adapt behavior to an environment that
can change on timescales ranging from seconds to months. Alternatively, a good approximation
to optimal prediction can be achieved by maintaining sequence statistics across a wide range of
timescales.36-38 In either case, sequential dependencies in rapid decision making are best understood
as a memory phenomenon akin to human long-term declarative memory rather than the byproduct
of short-term incremental learning.
The perspective that sequential effects reflect memory storage and updating offers a novel
interpretation of the continual and often long-range39 fluctuations observed in human behavior and
cognition. Far from being internal noise in the system, trial-to-trial variability in choice, response
latency, and movement reflect an adaptive process in which individuals exploit their extensive
experience to respond optimally to a dynamic world.
7 Methods
7.1 Experiment 1
Twenty-eight undergraduates participated for monetary compensation. Each subject performed
two sessions, one each in the Positive and Negative conditions. Sessions were spaced by 2-7 days,
and order was counterbalanced between subjects. One subject was removed from the analysis
because of an error recording responses during one block.
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The subject’s task was to respond to the location of a white dot, 5 mm in diameter, presented
11 mm above or 12 mm below a 4 mm horizontal white fixation line visible throughout the task.
Responses were made using a button box, oriented vertically so as to be spatially compatible
with target locations. The left and right index fingers were assigned to the two buttons, with the
assignment counterbalanced across subjects and fixed across sessions for each subject. Stimulus
duration was 100 ms. A 700 ms response-stimulus interval (RSI) followed each response. Reaction
time was recorded at 1000 HZ.
Each session consisted of 3402 experimental trials divided into 14 blocks of 243 trials. Within
each block, local stimulus histories were controlled to a depth of six trials, and the frequency of
each of the 64 (26) different trial sequences was exactly as dictated by the repetition rate for the
condition (1/3 and 2/3 for the Negative and Positive conditions, respectively). The actual stimulus
identities (above or below the fixation line) were equally probable. Subjects were given rest breaks
roughly every 116 trials, and additional practice and post-rest contextual lead-in trials were inserted
into the sequence for a total of 3744 trials.
7.2 Experiment 2
Twenty right-handed young adults participated for monetary compensation. Subjects sat in a chair
with full back support and made horizontal planar reaching movements while grasping the handle
of a robotic arm (Interactive Motion Technologies, Shoulder-Elbow Robot 2). The handle position,
handle velocity, and robot-generated force were recorded at 200 Hz.
The task was to move a cursor representing the handle position from a home circle to a target
circle 15 cm away and then rapidly back to the home circle, all displayed on a computer monitor
suspended vertically at eye level. Once subjects had centered the cursor within the home circle,
the target appeared, and an audio cue signaled the trial onset. On each trial, a perturbing force
was applied perpendicular to the desired direction of movement. The force increased linearly as a
function of distance from the home circle over the first 5cm (k=1 N/cm) and remained fixed at 5N
for the remaining 10cm. No forces were applied on the return. Subjects received warning messages
if trial durations exceeded 1.4 seconds.
Two versions of the task were run, identical except for the control of the stimulus sequences,
with 10 subjects each. In version 1, 10 introductory null trials with no forces were followed by 490
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force trials with the force direction randomly selected with equal probability. Subjects were given
a 30 second break after every 100 trials. In version 2, subjects completed a total of 1106 trials
with 10 introductory null trials and 30 second rests every 137 trials. The 9 trials following each
rest were excluded from analyses. Local stimulus histories of right and left trials were controlled
to a depth of 9 trials so that each of the 512 (29) trial sequences occurred exactly twice. For model
fitting, the deflection measures for right and left trials were normalized—for each subject—to have
the same mean and standard deviation, thus eliminating imbalances due to structural constraints
of the arm. All statistical analyses focus on model fits to individual subjects and collapsed across
data from the two versions of the experiment.
7.3 Modeling
The models form an expectation for trial t based on a weighting of past trials, w(`) for trial t− `,
and yield a quantity φt reflecting the match between expectation and actual outcome:
φt = xt
min(t−1,T )∑
`=1
w(`)xt−`,
where w(`) = λ` and w(`) = (1+`)κ for the exponential and power models, respectively, xt ∈ {−1, 1}
denotes the binary type of trial t (repetition versus alternation for Experiment 1, left versus right
for Experiment 2), and T is the context horizon.
To fit data, φt is converted to an RT or movement error via an affine transformation. In
both experiments, an additive offset was incorporated in the transformation of repetition trials to
allow for a default bias towards repetitions or alternations commonly observed in 2AFC studies.
Transformation and model parameters were fit to each subject separately to minimize the mean
squared error across individual trial predictions for the entire sequence of trials and were constrained
to be equal for the two conditions of Experiment 1.
7.3.1 HDBM Equations
The Dynamic Belief Model (DBM)33 assumes that individuals maintain a distribution over a single
environmental statistic, γt, that represents the probability of a repetition vs. alternation (Experi-
ment 1) or left vs. right (Experiment 2). The value of γt is inferred from the sequence history, xt−1,
12
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subject to the constraints of a fixed change probability, α. The expectation match, φt, is defined
to be P (xt|xt−1, α) which is given by E[γt|xt−1] when xt is a repetition and 1−E[γt|xt−1] when xt
is an alternation. The posterior distribution over γt is iteratively updated:
p(γt|xt−1, α) = (1− α)p(γt−1|xt−1, α) + αpγ , with
p(γt−1|xt−1, α) ∝ P (xt−1|γt−1)p(γt−1|xt−2, α),
where pγ is the standard uniform.
In the Hierarchical Dynamic Belief Model (HDBM), instead of assuming a fixed change prob-
ability α, we define αt as a time-varying change probability subject to the same dynamics that
govern γt in the DBM. Specifically, with probability η, called the ’meta change probability’, αt will
be redrawn from a Beta resampling distribution, pα, and with probability 1 − η, αt will remain
unchanged. In the HDBM, φt is defined as P (xt|xt−1):
P (xt|xt−1) =
∫ 1
0
P (xt|xt−1, a)p(αt = a|xt−1) da,
where P (xt|xt−1, a) is the DBM probability for the fixed changepoint a. The posterior distribution
over αt is recomputed iteratively:
p(αt = a|xt−1) = (1− η)p(αt−1 = a|xt−1) + η pα(αt = a), with
p(αt−1 = a|xt−1) ∝ P (xt−1|xt−2, a)p(αt−1 = a|xt−2).
The HDBM has 3 free parameters: the meta-change probability and 2 parameters for the resampling
distribution pα.
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